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How Did It Evolve, and What
Does It Mean for the Future?
Edward Palmer
6.1 Introduction
Mandatory public pension systems constitute a large and important
public commitment to the aged. They are typically constructed on the
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) principle and are designed to provide a deﬁned
beneﬁt from a speciﬁc pension age—in countries in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), this is typically age
sixty-ﬁve. In practice, the actual age at which individuals leave the labor
force is much lower due to older workers’ high take-up of disability and
occupational beneﬁts. Not infrequently, mandatory public or occupational
beneﬁts provide little opportunity to combine work with a beneﬁt, and as
a result, older workers must choose between being in or out of the work-
force. At the same time, PAYGO systems are being threatened by increas-
ing costs due to increasing dependency ratios.
The ﬁnancial instability of PAYGO systems can be resolved by changing
system design to encourage a higher ratio of years of work and contribu-
tions to beneﬁt years. More generally, pension systems should be actuari-
ally neutral in individual choices between work and leisure. They should
not be designed so that they eﬀectively tax those who choose to work
longer, although systems in the OECD presently do this very thing
(Gruber and Wise 1999). An advantage of deﬁned contribution (DC) sys-
tems over deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) systems is that they are actuarially fair.
Beginning with the mandatory public system and followed by major occu-
171pational schemes, Sweden converted its earnings-related schemes from DB
to DC in the 1990s. The process and implications of this process for future
beneﬁts and ﬁnancial stability are the topics of this paper.
Most OECD nations’ pension schemes originated during the 1930s or
later. Since that time the nature of the labor market and the character of
work and the workplace have changed dramatically. Health has improved
vastly due to improvements in medical technology, lifestyles, and working
environments. As a result, longevity has been increasing by about one year
for every ten years that pass, and is expected to improve at least at this
pace in the coming century. In spite of this, male workers worked fewer
years in the mid-1990s than they did in the mid-1970s. In the mid-1990s,
workers in most of the OECD worked only four to ﬁve years after the age
of ﬁfty-ﬁve, while life expectancy from age sixty was eighteen to twenty
years, depending on the country (Palmer 1999b). In the next quarter-
century, life expectancy from age sixty will rise by at least another two to
two and one-half years if it simply follows the trend of the past half-
century. Some believe that improvements in medical technology will lead
to a more spectacular change.
At the other end of the life span, people are devoting more time to
schooling, which leads to later entry into the workforce. If present trends
continue, individuals entering the workforce now will work about thirty-
ﬁve years and will be pensioners for about twenty-ﬁve years. The DB sys-
tems of the OECD countries were not designed for this environment, but
for one in which the typical worker entered the workforce at about age
twenty and worked into his or her sixties (i.e., more than forty years), with
a life expectancy from age sixty of about ﬁfteen years. No wonder we see
so many pension systems in crisis when we examine what is in store in the
coming twenty years (see, e.g., Disney 1999).
Should countries continue with PAYGO systems, or do individual
ﬁnancial-account systems provide a better alternative? Deﬁned contribu-
tion systems with full advance funding, by deﬁnition, deal with demo-
graphic risks: Individual rights depend on individual contributions and life
expectancy is factored into the individual annuity. This has led many ex-
perts and politicians to the conclusion that a complete or large-scale tran-
sition to full funding is the best path for the future. Countries in the OECD
have been reluctant to make this transition, however, due not only to the
high initial cost for the transition generation, but also to the ﬁnancial risk
involved. The potential advantage to the transition generation would be
that the return on ﬁnancial accounts would surpass the tax required to
implement the transition. Future generations would gain if the rate of re-
turn on ﬁnancial assets continued to surpass the rate of economic growth.
The ﬁnal tally on whether any generation will end up as winners or
losers in terms of future rates of return, all else being equal, requires us to
have the facts in hand. In fact, neoclassical wisdom as initially formulated
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come out the same color in the end—yet they are not all the same color in
the beginning, or even during the whole wash, as history has shown us. If
rates of return were to remain at their average levels of the past half-
century for another half-century, and if individual funds obtained an index
return at this rate, then the prophecy of the proponents of funding (e.g.,
Feldstein and Samwick 1997) would come true.
On the plus side of the account for more advance funding stands the
conventional wisdom that it is not wise to put all one’s eggs into one bas-
ket. A mixture of PAYGO (with its dependency on economic growth) and
funded (with ﬁnancial returns) systems could be the best medicine of all.
For example, the Polish reform has recently been implemented under the
banner of security through diversity (Go ´ra and Rutkowski 1997). Else-
where in Eastern European, Hungary (Palacios and Rocha 1998) and Lat-
via (Fox and Palmer 1999) have taken similar steps. The Swedish reform,
which is the focus of this paper, moved in this direction with the 1994
reform legislation (see Palmer 2000 for a more detailed discussion), al-
though the step is smaller than in these Eastern European countries. In
Europe, Italy (e.g., Castellino and Fornero 1999) and Germany (e.g.,
Bo ¨rsch-Supan, chap. 5 in this volume) are discussing ways of introducing
or promoting individual ﬁnancial accounts. In the reform debate in the
United States, increased advance funding has been one of the main alter-
natives discussed.
In Sweden, the discussion moved in the direction of lifetime accounts in
the early 1990s. Oﬃcial actuarial calculations presented by the National
Social Insurance Board (Allma ¨nna Tilla ¨ggspension [ATP] 1987) showed
that the old DB system was ﬁnancially unsustainable with low economic
growth and continued improvements in longevity. In addition, for a long
time it had been considered desirable to ﬁnd a way to move the large buﬀer
fund in the public system into the private ﬁnancial market. It had been
clear for some time that individual ﬁnancial accounts with contribution-
based rights would be a way to do this. It was also clear that in the coming
quarter-century, public (demographic reserve) funds would be needed to
help the retirement of baby boomers born in the 1940s, as well as to buﬀer
future demographic cycles.
Three principles emerged in the reform discussion in Sweden: First, ben-
eﬁts should be based on contributions from lifetime earnings. Second, in-
dexation should be based on the growth of the contribution wage base.
Third, annuities—even in the PAYGO system—should reﬂect changes in
life expectancy. These principles were put together in the concept pre-
sented by the government’s Pension Reform Group in 1992, and with this
Sweden’s notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) PAYGO scheme emerged
in print. The idea of NDC, which had been around conceptually in the
economic literature since Buchanan (1968), was given a face for the ﬁrst
Swedish Pension Reform: Its Past and Its Future 1731. In Sweden, persons born in 1938 will receive 20 percent of their beneﬁt according to
the new rules and 80 percent according to the old rules. The percentages for persons born in
1939 are 25 and 75 percent, respectively, and so on through persons born 1954, who receive
the entire beneﬁt according to the new rules. Persons born between 1946 and 1953 will receive
more than half their beneﬁts from the new system.
2. Extensive overviews of the entire reform are available from [http://www.pension/nu] and
[http://www.ppm.nu].
time. In addition, the 1992 concept called for individual ﬁnancial accounts
for a segment of the system, although the actual scale of the ﬁnancial
account system was left open at that juncture.
In 1994, Swedish Parliament passed legislation on an NDC PAYGO ﬁrst
pillar, supplemented by a second pillar with privately managed individual
ﬁnancial accounts. One year later (in 1995), the Italian Parliament passed
similar legislation (see, e.g., Tumbarello 2000 for a description). The ideas
and their construction in the Italian and Swedish legislation are similar,
although the Swedish transition into the new system is much faster,1 thus
avoiding the need for further reform for ﬁnancial purposes.
The details of the Swedish reform are available from many sources.2 In
this paper I will focus on how the reform evolved and what it means for
individuals and for society at large. The whole reform package in Sweden
represents in my mind a paradigm shift in thinking about public pension
provision, and to examine how the Swedish reform evolved is a valuable
exercise in itself. The NDC idea spread quickly, ﬁrst to Latvia and Poland,
then to a number of other countries perhaps leading one to ask, What is
so enticing about this PAYGO system? In my mind, what is new is that it
is a thoroughbred. It goes all the way in introducing deﬁned contribution
into the PAYGO framework.
The NDC PAYGO system with lifetime accounts, the appropriate index-
ation, and annuities based on life expectancy move the system in the direc-
tion of advance-funded systems when it comes to dealing with risk (as dis-
cussed in Palmer 1999). What remains diﬀerent compared with advance
funding, needless to say, is the potential diﬀerence in rates of return and
possible diﬀerences in the impact on savings and growth. The reform of the
PAYGO system also opened the door in Sweden for individual ﬁnancial-
account DC schemes within occupational schemes, and this is the path
they have begun to take. Generally, it can be argued that the paradigm
shift embodied in the Swedish reform is well suited to meet the foreseeable
future. One of the aims of this paper is to give the reader a better under-
standing of why this can be the case.
6.2 Overview of the Reform
Sweden has combined NDC PAYGO with a mandatory and universal
advance-funded DC component, with a total contribution rate of 18.5 per-
cent. Due to the DC design of the public system, participants can expect
174 Edward Palmer3. The blue-collar scheme began with a contribution rate of 2 percent but is now at 3.5
percent. The rate varies for municipal workers.
4. Palmer (2000a) describes the options available in constructing an NDC system.
this contribution rate to remain unchanged in the future. This shifts the
risk of ﬁnancing beneﬁts from future to current workers. Because annuities
in both systems are directly related to increasing longevity, there are actu-
arial advantages to working longer. There is no longer the “full-beneﬁt”
age that is typical of many OECD public DB schemes. Individuals may
continue to work and contribute to a higher lifetime annuity as long as
they desire. The reform also abolishes the special tax credit for pensioners,
and puts pension income on an equal footing with earnings.
Both components of the public scheme are based on individual lifetime
accounts; the diﬀerence is that in PAYGO system, accounts are not ﬁnan-
cial but notional (in the sense that there is no ﬁnancial backing). The
money contributed to the NDC system ﬁnances the beneﬁts of current
pensioners. Money contributed to the ﬁnancial account system is invested
in individually chosen funds. In both cases, however, the account is illiquid
until the individual claims an annuity at retirement. For this reason, the
principal diﬀerence between the systems from the point of view of the
individual is the rate of return. From the point of view of the economy,
there is a potential macroeconomic diﬀerence in the eﬀect on national sav-
ing. In fact, one of the motives behind the introduction of the funded com-
ponent of the Swedish system was to help create (forced) saving in Sweden
in the future, which will be discussed in some depth below.
The reform of the mandatory universal public schemes had repercus-
sions for occupational schemes, as well, during the 1990s. Sweden has had
quasi-mandatory, centrally negotiated, sector-based (occupational) pen-
sion schemes for 80–90 percent of the workforce since the mid-1970s. With
the announcement of the public reform, the schemes for private blue-collar
and local government employees, which together comprise more than half
of Sweden’s workforce, were transformed into advance-funded DC
schemes.
In sum, with the reform, all workers in Sweden pay a 16 percent contri-
bution rate to the PAYGO scheme and 2.5 percent to the mandatory
advance-funded scheme. In addition, the blue-collar and municipal em-
ployees contribute 2.5 to 4.5 percent3 to a quasi-mandatory DC scheme.
This gives many workers a total contribution rate of 5–7 percent in an
individual ﬁnancial account DC system. In addition, the occupational
schemes for private white-collar workers are also funded, but they are DB
rather than DC schemes.
6.2.1 NDC Accounts and Annuities
Table 6.1 provides an example of how the NDC system works.4 It de-
picts an individual with slightly higher than average full-time earnings,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.with values expressed in U.S. dollars. The NDC system is a typical account
system. Contributions based on a certain percentage of earnings (in the
example, 18.5 percent) are noted in an account. The account balance in-
creases with indexation from one year to the next, and with new contribu-
tions from the current year. In Sweden, accounts are indexed with the per
capita wage. In the example, individual earnings increase at the same rate
as the per capita wage for an individual who enters the workforce at the
age of twenty-two and continues to work every year until he or she claims
a beneﬁt. A beneﬁt can be claimed from age sixty-one in Sweden. The
example illustrates how the combination of additional earnings and contri-
butions, the continued growth of the notional capital balance with index-
ation, and the change in life expectancy from retirement enhance the bene-
ﬁt—and the earnings replacement rate.
The beneﬁt is calculated in the table in two ways. First, it is calculated
by dividing the capital balance at the time of retirement by unisex life
expectancy for persons the age of the person retiring. This is not how it is
done in Sweden, but is how it is done in other countries that have followed
the Swedish model (e.g., Latvia and Poland). In the Swedish system, as in
the Italian reform legislated a year after the Swedish reform, the annuity
also includes an imputed real rate of growth. In Sweden, this rate is 1.6
percent. (In Italy the rate is set at 1.5 percent.) A second example in the
table shows what this means for the individual’s annuity at retirement,
compared to the use of life expectancy alone.
The annuity is indexed annually to the consumer price index (CPI). The
annuity calculated with real growth of 1.6 percent implies real wage index-
ation over the lifetime at this rate. What happens if real long-term growth
falls short of 1.6 percent? To maintain ﬁnancial stability, given this form
of front loading, this index is supplemented with an additional index that
is based on the diﬀerence between actual growth and 1.6 percent. If actual
growth is higher than 1.6 percent, the beneﬁt is indexed upward according
to the diﬀerence, and if it is lower, the beneﬁt is adjusted downward ac-
cording to the diﬀerence. Over the lifetime, this form of indexation of pen-
sions gives the same result as straightforward wage indexation.
The front-loaded annuity shifts a part of the expected value of the total
beneﬁt stream, given life expectancy and the real return of 1.6 percent,
from the future to the present. Compared to straightforward indexation of
a beneﬁt providing the same total income in retirement, this gives pension-
ers more money when young, but less when older. The Swedish annuity
thus assumes that individuals discount future consumption in favor of
present consumption. This method also provided a smooth transition from
the old ATP system with its price-indexed beneﬁt that, with real wage
growth, declined in value over time relative to a current average wage.
The system as it has been implemented in Sweden is not perfectly ﬁ-
nancially stable under all circumstances, for at least two reasons. The esti-
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rium requires spontaneous adjustment, and with the fact that the system has a demographic
fund earning a ﬁnancial market rate of return that may surpass the notional (economic) rate,
thereby helping the system with liquidity.
mate of life expectancy used to compute the annuity is derived from the
outcome of the immediate past, and is not based on a forward-looking
projection. Imbalance can occur if the contribution base (wage sum) grows
slower than per capita earnings (used for indexation in Sweden), or if lon-
gevity turns out to be greater than the estimate used in calculating the an-
nuity.
In order to deal with this, yet another indexation mechanism was intro-
duced into the Swedish system to brake downward pressure that can arise
with a declining labor force or deviations from actual longevity. This bal-
ance mechanism is based on the development of system debt relative to
the debt that would arise in equilibrium and corrects for all technical im-
perfections in the actual construction of the system.5 The system will be
endowed from the beginning with a buﬀer fund having signiﬁcant starting
capital from a similar fund from the old system. The fund will be used,
however, as was originally intended when the system was conceived in the
1950s: as a demographic buﬀer. It will be drawn on to ﬁnance the baby
boomers in 2010–25.
6.2.2 Is the Swedish Scheme an Innovation?
Boskin, Kotlikoﬀ, and Shoven (1988; hereafter BKS) and the French
point system are probably alternative schemes that bear the closest resem-
blance to the Swedish model, but they diﬀer in principle in that they are
faithful to the DB genre in various ways. In the French system, points are
calculated by dividing an individual’s contributions in a given year by an
amount based on a reference wage. Workers receive extra points when they
are sick, injured, or unemployed, or when they have three or more chil-
dren. These are “free of charge,” which means that there is redistribution
within the system. There are also free points covering the working period
before the creation of the scheme. A worker thus receives a yearly beneﬁt
increment expressed as points. A full pension is paid at age sixty or sixty-
ﬁve, depending on circumstances. When the individual chooses to retire,
points are added up and multiplied by the current value of a point.
The value of points is determined by a board on the basis of an estimate
of the resources of the system. In determining available resources, the
board takes the interests of employers, workers, and pensioners into con-
sideration. In sum, the system diﬀers considerably from the Swedish sys-
tem. It attempts to remain faithful to the DB genre by deﬁning points
and a full-beneﬁt pension age. Redistribution is ﬁnanced from within the
178 Edward Palmer6. In the Swedish NDC and ﬁnancial account systems, individuals are informed on an
annual basis of the development of their accounts, and are given a beneﬁt projection using
current life expectancy and alternative assumptions about their retirement ages and about
economic growth, and using current life projections.
system, so part of a contribution can be viewed as a tax rather than an
insurance premium payment, as in the Swedish NDC scheme. The Swed-
ish system is a pure insurance model, with “extra credits” ﬁnanced sepa-
rately. Finally, in the French point system, the value of a point is deter-
mined by a discretionary process. In the construction of the Swedish
model, autonomy from discretionary decisions and from the risk of manip-
ulation for political gain were deemed necessary to maintain the credibility
of the system.
In the BKS model life expectancy in the year the contributions are paid
is used to determine the incremental value of that year’s contributions to-
ward a pension. To achieve system balance, a weighting factor is used.
This factor is calculated from a projection of future retirement behavior
and from survivor and disability take-up. In other words, the rate of return
in the BKS model depends on the performance of the overall system for
old age, disability, and survivors. The aim is to maintain ﬁnancial stability
within the entire system. An increase in the frequency of disability or num-
ber of survivors would yield lower old age pensions, but decreased disabil-
ity take-up or fewer survivor years in the system would enhance old age
beneﬁts.
From the point of view of the participant, the yearly points derived in
the French and BKS systems do not give a clearer picture of the future
than does the Swedish system. In the Swedish system, individuals can fol-
low the development of life expectancy and beneﬁts as the National Social
Insurance Board sends out its annual beneﬁt projections.6 In other words,
there seems to be no information advantage in aspiring to deﬁne beneﬁt
increments, as in the French and BKS models.
An important feature of the Swedish reform is that it divorced the dis-
ability and survivor beneﬁt systems from the old age system, in order to
create a pure insurance system covering old age only. Neither the French
point system nor the BKS proposal for the United States do this. The
Swedish model moves disability out of the system, but calculates the cost
of providing old age beneﬁts to the disabled from age sixty-ﬁve and trans-
fers the resources needed to ﬁnance these costs to the old age scheme.
Direct application of the BKS model transfers disability costs to all cur-
rent workers by reducing their future pensions, whereas the Swedish model
claims the resources from the present consumption of workers. Moreover,
the Swedish model sets the spotlight directly on the problem.
Separating the old age and disability systems also makes it possible fo-
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tended to be driven by “moral hazard.” Moral hazard results because em-
ployers know they can let older workers drift into sickness and then dis-
ability without taking adequate measures at the workplace (e.g., adapting
work tasks and work hours, providing necessary breaks, giving physical
and vocational training with new technology, etc.) to prevent this. There
also must be acceptance of the possibility that wages for older workers do
not need to keep up with those of younger workers.
Proponents of the Swedish model (including the present author) claim
that it is important to distinguish clearly the merits, problems, consequent
design, and hence, the messages of the design of the old age system from
those of the disability system. The Swedish model separates social policy
from social insurance. The earnings-related old age system is set up as an
insurance system, and redistribution is moved into social policy. Social
policy—which includes a minimum guarantee for old age pensioners,
credits for childbirth, and more (to be discussed below)—is ﬁnanced from
the state budget with general tax revenues.
Finally, as opposed to DB systems that focus on retirement as an event,
DC-based systems put the spotlight on work and on the rewards associ-
ated with a longer working life. With the prospects of declining numbers
in the workforce it now appears that older workers will have to be viewed
as an asset and kept on in order to meet the overall demand for labor.
Deﬁned contribution systems combined with tax (and other) rules that are
neutral between work and retirement go a long way toward reducing the
distortions between work and leisure for older workers. The transition to
DC systems erases impediments for continued work, and may help in-
crease the age at which individuals leave the workforce as improvements
in health and longevity continue. It will nevertheless be important to adjust
the minimum age at which a beneﬁt can be claimed as life expectancy im-
proves.
6.2.3 The Funded Second Pillar of the Mandatory System:
Individual Financial Accounts
The funded second pillar of the mandatory public system can best be
viewed in terms of an accumulation period and an annuity period. For the
accumulation period, Sweden has developed what has come to be called
the clearing-house model, as opposed to a more traditional insurance
model. During the accumulation period, individuals can choose freely
among one or more funds registered with the system. In the ﬁrst year of
choice, 2000, about 500 funds were registered in the system. Although
there will be no funds dealing solely with derivatives, there are in principle
no restrictions on fund portfolio composition. This means that the individ-
ual chooses his or her own combination of risks and returns.
This construction can be compared with an alternative that is based
180 Edward Palmer7. Increasing life expectancy gradually decreases the size of the annuity, all else equal.
on one or on a small number of index funds. For persons with the same
accumulation period, an index fund will yield similar beneﬁts; however,
there still may be considerable diﬀerences between persons (and especially
between age cohorts) who do not have the same accumulation period. The
index fund idea was not adopted. The logic behind the alternative chosen
is that, generally speaking, all funds can be expected to produce positive
long-term returns, albeit of varying size. With unrestricted choice, persons
can move freely between funds. No one is locked in a disadvantageous
fund against his or her will.
The rate of return in the second pillar is thus determined by ﬁnancial
market development and individual choice of funds. In principle, table 6.1
is also a way to illustrate how the second-pillar ﬁnancial accounts work, if
one interprets the rate of return on the capital balance as a ﬁnancial rate
of return. Upon retirement, individuals can claim a ﬁxed- or variable-rate
annuity in the system. A variable-rate annuity is the result of leaving
money in the individual’s fund(s), as the annuity will reﬂect changes in
fund values. A ﬁxed-rate annuity is obtained by transferring individual
capital at retirement to the state (monopoly) annuity provider. Annuities
are based on unisex life expectancy.
The choice to limit the publicly managed component to a contribution
rate of 2.5 percent was the result of a political compromise between the
Social Democratic Party’s position that the whole public system should be
PAYGO, and the governing parties’ preference for a larger advance-funded
component. In addition, there was an agreement not to increase the scale
of the entire public system, taking into consideration the fact that the vast
majority of employees are also covered by supplementary occupational
schemes. The supplementary system for blue-collar workers was also con-
verted into an individual ﬁnancial account DC system with a contribution
rate of 3.5 percent. As has already been noted, the outcome for this and
other groups is that the sum of the public mandatory and quasi-mandatory
occupational contribution rate for old age coverage is approximately 22–23
percent, of which 5–7 percent goes to advance funding, depending on the
sector in which they are employed.
Finally, the funded component of the public system was ﬁt into the cost
restriction (contribution rate of 18.5 percent) of the overall system without
creating a new tax for future generations, by tightening up the system for
those generations instead.7 Younger workers traded future beneﬁt rights in
the PAYGO system for rights in the ﬁnancial account system. If a higher
portion of the 18.5 percent earmarked for the total system had been chan-
neled into the ﬁnancial account system, it would have had to be tax ﬁ-
nanced. Taxes had been increased during the deep recession in the early
1990s in order to restrict the size of the deﬁcits. At the same time as the
Swedish Pension Reform: Its Past and Its Future 1818. Credits are given for a maximum of four years per child, and for one child at a time. Two
children born two years apart give a credit of six years. The claimant (usually the mother) is
entitled to the most advantageous of (a) an amount equal to 75 percent of average earnings
for all covered persons; (b) 80 percent of her own earnings the year prior to childbirth;
and (c) a supplement consisting of a ﬁxed amount, indexed over time to the (covered) per
capita wage.
reform was being discussed and introduced, there was an agreement
among all the major parties not to increase taxes any further, but instead
to decrease them once budget balance had been achieved.
6.2.4 The New Paradigm and Social Policy
As the Swedish welfare state was being constructed in the 1960s and
1970s, there was a general feeling among policy makers and scholars that it
was not important to identify the uses of funds in the government budget.
Although the type of taxation might matter for individual decisions, the
connection between a source of funds and a beneﬁt was not considered to
be important. The NDC PAYGO paradigm is based on the idea that it
does matter. In principle, the NDC system is a pure insurance system:
Individual lifetime contributions, and a return on these, determine an indi-
vidual’s capital when it is time to calculate an annuity at retirement. The
individual is not paying a tax but is making a mandatory contribution to
provide for his or her own future retirement.
Social policy is still important, but in making the above distinction, one
is now arguing that the tax-transfer system per se is to be used for social
policy. Redistribution is separated from the insurance system. Redistribu-
tional policy takes two primary forms: First, the main instrument of social
policy is the guarantee pension for persons aged sixty-ﬁve and older. This
is paid for through the tax-transfer system—that is, the state budget. Sec-
ond, credits can be given to notional and ﬁnancial accounts in the insur-
ance system as long as they are accompanied by external ﬁnancing. With-
out the external ﬁnancing, the system would no longer be in ﬁnancial
equilibrium.
The Swedish system contains generous credits in conjunction with child-
birth, which go almost exclusively to mothers and which can in total be
the equivalent of a contribution rate of an additional three-fourths of one
percent, but ﬂuctuating with the number and timing of births.8 There are
also credits for time spent in military conscription and in pursuing higher
education. Insured periods with beneﬁts from sickness insurance, disabil-
ity insurance, and unemployment insurance also give credits, and these
credits are accompanied by money that is transferred into the pension
system.
The guarantee pension is the primary safety net for pensioners. Individ-
uals aged sixty-ﬁve and older can qualify for a guarantee beneﬁt. The guar-
antee tops-oﬀ the two earnings-related beneﬁts up to a speciﬁed ceiling.
182 Edward PalmerFor a single person, the guarantee by itself amounts to about 75 percent,
after tax, of what is needed to reach the level set by the social authorities
to obtain social assistance. The lifetime poor with no or only a very small
earnings-related beneﬁt will also qualify for a means-tested housing allow-
ance, which normally is suﬃcient to bring him or her up to the national
minimum standard for a pensioner. If this is still not enough, the individual
has a right to means-tested social assistance.
In sum, the insurance system is separated from the social policy instru-
ments in the new Swedish system. The insurance system links beneﬁts di-
rectly to contributions and is designed to be ﬁnancially stable over all gen-
erations. Social policy vis-a `-vis the pension system is an entirely external
aﬀair. Credits backed by money can be voted upon in Parliament and
transferred into the pension system. They can also be changed at some
future date without aﬀecting rights acquired and ﬁnanced in the past. This
gives Parliament latitude to change its mind on distributional issues with-
out going back on its earlier promises, which have already been ﬁnanced.
One of the problems with the old system was that transfers built into the
DB formula were not targeted; these turned out, upon close examination,
to be arbitrary, and it was realized that they generally did not do what
people believed they did or should do. Namely, they tended to beneﬁt per-
sons with steep earning careers. The reform has changed this.
6.2.5 The Outcome of the Reform for the Individual
A popular public misconception was that the old system replaced 60
percent of earnings at retirement, because the ATP formula was based on
0.6 times the individual’s highest ﬁfteen-year average earnings. Everyone
with ATP and residing in Sweden also received the ﬂat-rate folkpension—
which was the ﬂoor in the system—and as a result could expect a replace-
ment rate higher than 60 percent. Exactly how much higher depended on
individual earnings levels, because the ﬂat-rate supplement gave a higher
replacement rate the lower individual earnings were. In sum, a pension in
the old system could give varied replacement rates.
For most individuals, with average individual earnings growth of 1 per-
cent, replacement was 60 percent—and with average individual earnings
growth of 2 percent, replacement was 56 percent—of the ﬁnal year’s earn-
ings before retirement. However, as we know, replacement rates in terms
of ﬁnal earnings may make little sense anyway because ﬁnal earnings may
not represent normal earnings. With the occupational supplement, which
provided about 10 percent more, the replacement rate from the mandatory
public systems and the occupational schemes was about 65–75 percent,
depending on individual earnings growth during the ﬁfteen years prior
to retirement.
How does the new system compare with this? Pensions for the typical
Swede are composed of the two components of the mandatory system—
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cial accounts in the public system—and a group occupational scheme.
Table 6.2 illustrates how all three of these work together.
The group occupational scheme for blue-collar workers was converted
into a DC system with individual ﬁnancial accounts in line with the reform
of the public system. For the blue-collar worker, a total contribution rate of
6 percent (2.5 percent public  3.5 percent occupational) goes to ﬁnancial
accounts. All calculations assume a rate of return of 1.6 percent per annum
during the annuity period. The life expectancy is for persons born in 1975.
Table 6.2 shows that with a rate of return of about 5 percent in the ﬁnan-
cial account systems, under the assumptions used here a replacement rate
of 70 percent can be reached at age sixty-ﬁve.
As the example in table 6.2 illustrates, the ﬁnancial rate of return is
crucial. Financial rates in the range of 2–5 percent provide a replacement
rate in line with traditional Swedish expectations about income replace-
ment at retirement. Historically, from 1919 to 1996, the average real rate
of return on Swedish stocks has been 8.6 percent while the real yield on
bonds has been 3.1 percent (Frennberg and Hansson 1992; Lag om premie-
pension 1997). A mixed portfolio of stocks and bonds would yield about a
6 percent real rate of return, and a portfolio with a greater share of stocks
would move upward to 8–9 percent if history were to repeat itself. In fact,
if the ﬁnancial rate of return is about 8 percent, these calculations suggest
that Swedes are overinsured, because earnings replacement rates of more
Table 6.2 Replacement Rates (annuity as percentage of last earnings)
Return for Public Second Return for NDC  Public
Pillar (2.5%)  Group Second Pillar  Group
NDC Only Occupational (3.5%) Occupational
(contribution
Age rate 16%) 2% 5% 8% 2% 5% 8%
61 0.32 0.12 0.23 0.47 0.44 0.55 0.79
62 0.33 0.13 0.25 0.52 0.46 0.58 0.85
63 0.35 0.14 0.27 0.57 0.49 0.62 0.92
64 0.37 0.15 0.29 0.63 0.52 0.66 1.00
65 0.39 0.15 0.31 0.69 0.54 0.70 1.11
66 0.42 0.16 0.33 0.76 0.58 0.75 1.18
67 0.44 0.17 0.36 0.83 0.61 0.80 1.27
68 0.47 0.18 0.39 0.92 0.65 0.86 1.39
69 0.50 0.19 0.42 1.01 0.69 0.92 1.51
70 0.53 0.20 0.45 1.12 0.73 0.98 1.65
Source: Based on Palmer (2000).
Notes: The individual’s earnings are assumed to grow at a real rate of 2 percent per annum
throughout the earning career. The rate of growth used for indexation of capital in the
PAYGO system is 2 percent. The PAYGO, second-pillar, and group occupational annuities
are all based on unisex life expectancy and a real rate of return on capital from retirement
of 1.6 percent.
184 Edward Palmerthan 100 percent by age sixty-ﬁve overshoot by far what most people be-
lieve is necessary. With this perspective, it would be possible to reduce
PAYGO commitments in the future.
A ﬁnal word of caution is in order. Replacement rates are diﬃcult to
work with because earnings proﬁles are usually more complicated than
those used in the examples here. Earnings grow every year, and at a con-
stant rate, in table 6. 2. Empirical evidence shows that earnings proﬁles for
older workers ﬂatten and may even decline. As a result, if we were to as-
sume no earnings growth after age sixty (or some other age prior to sixty),
replacement rates based on earnings the year prior to retirement would
become much higher than those reported in the table. In sum, table 6.2
provides a basis for understanding how the combined systems work, but
indicates only relative diﬀerences in replacement rates based on the as-
sumptions employed.
6.3 Why Reform?
The 1994 reform replaced a DB system consisting of the ﬂat-rate folk-
pension and the earnings-related ATP scheme introduced in 1960. The lat-
ter provided a full beneﬁt at age sixty-ﬁve (age sixty-seven until July 1976),
with thirty years of contribution history and based on an average of the
best ﬁfteen years of reported earnings (indexed to the CPI). Why did it
become necessary to reform this system?
There were three major reasons for the reform. First, the old system was
unfair: To a considerable extent, it transferred money from persons with
lower lifetime resources to persons with higher lifetime resources. Second,
it was ﬁnancially perverse: It transferred a larger percent of resources from
workers to pensioners when economic growth was low and less when real
growth was high. Together with an increasing trend in life expectancy, a
scenario with low real growth threatened to create an increasing burden
on the working generation. The cost of the old age system could have
increased from 18 percent to as much as 30 percent by 2030, with a low
rate of growth. Few believed that future workers would regard this as toler-
able, and thus most agreed that something had to be done.
A third reason for reform was the observation that, when the baby-
boom cohort were to become pensioners, the large pension fund that had
been accumulated since 1960 (equal to roughly 40 percent of GDP in the
1990s) would be depleted at the latest by around 2020. Although there was
less consensus around this point, many believed it was important to create
new “replacement” saving, but that any new form of forced saving should
be managed through private-sector investment decisions.
The ATP system had served its original purpose well during its ﬁrst
three decades. It had been designed to provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts to per-
sons born around 1905 to 1920, whose lives—and human capital—had
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a generous transition rule requiring only twenty years for a full beneﬁt for
persons born before 1915, twenty-one years for persons born in 1915, and
so on, up to thirty years for persons born in 1924 and after. Not surpris-
ingly, then, Sta ˚hlberg (1990) ﬁnds that pensioners born between 1905 and
1914 could expect to receive lifetime beneﬁts six times greater than their
contributions. The return falls for younger cohorts. Persons born in 1944
and later were covered during all their (potential) working careers from
age sixteen by the ATP system. Sta ˚hlberg shows that persons born between
1944 and 1950 and later could expect at retirement to get back only 80
percent of what they paid in contributions.
A system that returns less than a Krona for every discounted Krona
paid in could be defended on the grounds that it is intended to redistribute
money from the rich to the poor, and thereby constitutes a part of a coun-
try’s redistribution policy. With current patterns of work, however, Sta ˚hlb-
erg’s study showed that the system transferred lifetime resources from the
lower to the upper classes: from wage earners with long earnings careers
and ﬂatter lifetime earnings proﬁles to professionals and others with in-
creasing earnings proﬁles.
The thirty-year rule worked against the typical blue-collar worker,
whose earnings career is long but can be relatively ﬂat. At the other ex-
treme, it worked in favor of the white-collar worker with a longer period
of education and later entrance into the labor market, but with a rising
earnings career throughout almost all his or her working life and generally
higher lifetime earnings. The ﬁfteen-year rule was clearly to the advantage
of persons with good earnings growth toward the ends of their careers,
which is the case for any DB system in which beneﬁts are based largely or
wholly on career-end earnings.
The major claim for the thirty-year rule was that it was to the advantage
of women, because women work part-time during a signiﬁcant portion of
their working careers. This claim received some support from Sta ˚hlberg’s
work on the redistribution eﬀects of the old system, based on the fact that
the negative return on contributions for upper- and middle-class women
was slightly less than the negative return for males born in the same pe-
riod. This implies an intergender transfer. This transfer was very small,
however, and did not hold for working-class women, who were, in fact, the
group who could expect to get the least out of a Krona put into the old
system. In sum, the old Swedish system was hard to justify on social redis-
tribution grounds.
On top of this, the system was ﬁnancially unstable. Actuarial calcula-
tions produced by the National Social Insurance Board showed that the
contribution rate would have to continue to increase in the future, and
considerably so, if long-term real economic growth were to fall well below
2 percent. Viewed over any 20-year period, beneﬁts were largely deter-
186 Edward Palmer9. This is demonstrated in the analytical work performed for the reform (Reformerat pen-
sionssystem: Kostnader och individeﬀekter 1994, 40).
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mined by acquired rights of both pensioners and older workers, which
were price indexed and hence immobile in the face of changes in real
growth.9 Growth aﬀected beneﬁts slowly through increased wages and new
acquired rights of younger workers. With acquired rights in the coming
twenty years already nearly established, the contribution rate required to
pay for them was determined almost exclusively by the real rate of growth
of the contribution base. With real economic growth of 1 percent per year,
the contribution rate would increase to about 27 percent. On the other
hand, real growth of 3 percent would be suﬃcient to maintain a constant
contribution rate.
It is noteworthy that when the old system was being constructed, toward
the end of the 1950s, economists were using a 3 percent real growth rate
as their pessimistic scenario for the long-term future. At that time, real
growth was around 4–5 percent in Sweden. It would have been diﬃcult in
the 1990s to ﬁnd a Swedish economist who believed in permanent real
growth as high as 3 percent. Most believed that Sweden would do well to
produce long-term growth of 2 percent. In fact, some believe that hourly
wages are already so high that new entrants into the workforce could be
more interested in working fewer hours in order to have more leisure time,
and that growth as high as 2 percent would soon become history.
When the ATP reform was introduced in 1960, economists argued that
the improvement in beneﬁts would replace some private saving, and that
national saving was likely to decrease as a result of the reform. Later, stud-
ies by Markowski and Palmer (1979), Palmer (1981), and Berg (1983)10
provided empirical evidence that through 1980, private saving had indeed
decreased. The saving rate of households would have been 2–4 percent
higher in the absence of the reform, according to these studies. However,
from 1960 to 1982, contributions to the earnings-related ATP pension sys-
tem were higher than was needed to pay for beneﬁts. In fact, during this
period, this was more than what was needed to counteract the estimated
decline in household saving (Markowski and Palmer 1979).
Sweden’s sizable public pension funds (about 40 percent of GDP) have
been surrounded by considerable political controversy during most of their
forty years of existence. Here, there has always been a clear dividing line
between, on one hand, the Social Democratic Party and the left, and on
the other, the parties to the right of the political spectrum. The agreement
that was reached and strictly upheld through 1974 (and then moderated
only slightly) was that the funds should be invested only in bonds and
direct loans to companies—not in equities. In spite of this, in 1974 an
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equity fund was created and allocated a small portion of the total reserves,
and this was supplemented with additional equity funds as time passed.
The share in the total portfolio of the market value of equities11 in the
1990s has been under 15 percent.
The ﬁnancial market was highly regulated in Sweden into the 1980s.
This meant that the public pension fund was required to hold a large share
of its portfolio in government and mortgage-backed bonds at a lower than
market value. Regulation is estimated to have held down bond yields by
at least one percentage point. In practice, this meant that consumption
possibilities were shifted from the future to the present, subsidizing mort-
gages and government debt. The ﬁnancial market was gradually deregu-
lated in the 1980s, and these restrictions were lifted.
It is also likely that many politicians have viewed the pension fund as a
part of the consolidated ﬁnancial balance of the public sector, leading to
less discipline regarding public expenditures. Beginning with the second
crisis involving the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), from 1978 through 1982, and then once again during the ﬁrst
half of the 1990s, following a ﬁnancial crisis, Sweden combated deep reces-
sion with heavy government borrowing. Following recovery in the 1980s,
politicians were more inclined to increase rather than decrease expenditure
commitments. Perhaps a new order with public pension funds held in indi-
vidual ﬁnancial accounts instead of in central public funds will have a
sobering eﬀect on future political expenditure decisions.
Whereas there was broad agreement from the beginning regarding the
problems with the old system, political interests diverged considerably on
the issue of funding. The non-socialist parties had never supported a large
public fund within a PAYGO framework. For them, if there was to be
substantial social security funding in the future, this would have to be
funneled into the private market. The Social Democratic Party, with the
support of the large blue-collar labor organization Landsorganisationen
(LO), were satisﬁed with a public fund and were not worried about its size.
At the time the pension reform was to be formulated, saving in Sweden
was at an all-time low; household saving had been declining steadily, and
widespread concern about this trend transcended political interests. Given
the more general goal of creating new forced saving, it appeared logical
for the Social Democratic Party to open itself to the position of the parties
to the right in this issue. In addition, with this concession it would be
possible for the parties to the right to agree on a larger mandatory system
than they otherwise were prepared to concede. This opened the door for
the introduction of a system with mandatory, privately managed, individ-
ual ﬁnancial accounts.
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6.4 The Reform Process
The ATP reform of 1960 was the ﬂagship of Social Democratic social
policy rhetoric and of the social policy of the welfare state that emerged
under a series of Social Democratic governments from after World War II
through 1976. What is more, the political intentions behind the 1960 re-
form had been fulﬁlled. Persons retiring in the 1970s and 1980s were doing
better and better. From 1970 to 1989, more than half of an increase of 1.8
percent in real wages—prior to deductions for contributions—was redis-
tributed through employer contributions to the social insurance system,
mainly to ﬁnance the increase in pension beneﬁts.12 Old age pensioners
have been the redistribution winners from the mid-1970s (see, e.g., Gus-
tafsson and Palmer 1997). By the early 1990s, the average standard of an
ATP pensioner was not much below that of someone living in a household
with children, once the weighted consumption needs of all family members
were taken into account.
The success of the system in improving pensioners’ standard of living
was not generally associated by the public, with the low rate of growth of
take-home pay over the same period. Even had it been recognized, it is
not clear that this alone would have created intergenerational friction, as
long as younger generations of workers could expect the intergenerational
commitment to be honored. The question was, could they? From 1977 into
the mid-1980s, the welfare state had been held up on credit. This was not
what its architects had had in mind. As the 1980s rolled out, substantial
pension debt (promises) was being augmented by a large increase in the
state budget debt. This came at a time when the economic literature was
focusing on this issue, and the discussion ﬁltered quickly into the public
debate. In addition, the National Social Insurance Board published an
actuarial report in 1983 revealing the extreme dependence of the system
on good economic growth to maintain ﬁnancial stability.
It was logical, then, that in October 1984, as Sweden pulled out of its
ﬁrst deep and prolonged post–World War II recession, a new Social Dem-
ocratic government initiated a Pension Commission. In its directives to
the commission, the government expressed concern about the long-term
viability of the whole package of welfare promises to the elderly—health
and community care as well as pensions. The instructions from the govern-
ment to the commission were to examine all of these, with particular em-
phasis on the ﬁnancial stability of the pension system and the interaction
between the pension system and the economy.
By 1990, when it was dissolved, the commission had published well over
1,000 pages of analysis and discussion. It had made few proposals, al-
though the two that had been made were also passed in Parliament. First,
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the commission had been instructed to examine how the survivor beneﬁt
available only to women in the old system could be made equal in status
to that for men. The commission proposed that the survivor beneﬁt for
women born after 1945 should be abolished, arguing that men and women
born after the war were participating on equal terms in the labor market,
and that hence, there was no need to provide for a special beneﬁt for
women. This proposal was legislated by Parliament and went into eﬀect in
1990. Here, it can be claimed, a political desire to promote gender equality
in all aspects of life shadowed the potential need for a little extra insurance
for elderly survivors of both genders. In practice, this measure had the
eﬀect of privatizing survivor insurance, while it saved considerable money
for the public sector in the long run.
The commission’s second proposal was to abolish a right to be converted
from unemployment to disability insurance for persons who had been un-
employed from 58.3 years of age. This mechanism had been used in con-
sensus between employers and unions to get around the seniority rules for
older workers when redundancies were declared.13 The commission ex-
pressed concern over the fact that the disability system was being used to
remedy unemployment, and when this decision was being made (in 1988)
unemployment was at a historical low in Sweden. The change was also
logical because demographic projections pointed toward a future shortage
in the supply of labor. Given this perspective, it seemed unnecessary to
give employers and unions the continued opportunity to use the disability
system to minimize the need to let younger workers go—by pushing older
workers into disability—when trimming down businesses.
The Pension Commission of the 1980s made no proposals about re-
forming the old age system per se. It had been impossible for the political
parties and interest groups that formed the commission to agree on any-
thing. To the public, the chairman of the commission explained this by
claiming that the commission saw no acute need for reform because the
economy was doing so well and could be expected to do so for a long time
to come. Seemingly in deﬁance of this bold optimism, the economy began
its downward spiral within a year after this statement was made. Ac-
cording to usual procedure in Sweden, the report was sent to political
organizations, interest groups, government agencies, and academic institu-
tions to provide them with the opportunity to comment formally. In this
way, the report, which analyzed clearly the shortcomings of the system,
signaled the start of serious debate about reform.
In 1991, Skandia, a large private insurance company in Sweden, pre-
sented calculations for a proposal for a partial transition to a system with
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privately managed individual ﬁnancial accounts. These calculations
showed that a transition to more advance funding would be expensive for
younger workers. With an estimate of costs in hand, some supporters of a
transition to a large-scale advance-funded system with privately managed
individual ﬁnancial accounts toned down their claims. Proponents of pri-
vately managed ﬁnancial accounts also directed their eﬀorts toward re-
stricting the size of the PAYGO mandatory commitments. To this end,
they focused on maintaining a low ceiling on covered earnings and holding
down the size of the contribution rate.
Another problem with the old system that entered the public discussion
around 1990 was that average yearly full-time earnings were already very
close to the ceiling on covered earnings (about 80 percent). On the other
hand, since 1982, contributions had been paid on all earnings. Without
indexation of the ceiling for real growth, it was easy to show that average
earnings would surpass the ceiling and that, eventually, the system would
evolve into a ﬂat-rate system anyway. The speed of this process would
depend on the rate of real wage growth.
A scenario in which covered earnings came close to the ceiling had con-
siderable political support from the right because it implied gradual re-
trenchment of the public commitment and future privatization. At the
other extreme, Social Democratic voters and voters to the left of this party
still believed that the old ATP system should be kept intact with minimal
changes. The joker in the deck, just as in the 1950s,14 was the large white-
collar union, Tja ¨nstemannens Centralorganisation (TCO). In the spring of
1990, TCO had managed to kill a switch to a 20-40 rule being considered
by the Pension Commission in the ﬁnal hours of its work, by leaking the
idea to mass media and then claiming that it would be to the extreme
disadvantage of women. Many of the members of this union had much to
gain by an increase in the ceiling, because many of those with earnings
above the ceiling were white-collar managers represented by TCO. Their
employers were paying both the “tax” on earnings above the ceiling, while
at the same time they were required to ﬁnance occupational pension insur-
ance to cover the same earnings, because the tax did not give social insur-
ance rights.
Interestingly, for a long time there was a natural alliance around the
ceiling issue between the blue-collar union (LO) and the Employer Confed-
eration. Because ATP was ﬁnanced by employer contributions, letting the
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system evolve slowly into a ﬂat-rate system (i.e., with a gradual decline in
acquired rights per Krona paid) implied limiting employer contribution
increases for the public system, but higher costs for the occupational
schemes. From the mid-1980s the Swedish Employer Confederation (Sven-
ska Arbetsgivarfo ¨rening, or SAF) had opposed overall increases in the em-
ployer contribution rate, including changes needed to ﬁnance the ATP sys-
tem.15 The view of LO was that as long as their own members were not
seriously aﬀected by the ceiling on covered earnings, this progressive tax
should be kept. This view was also shared by the Social Democratic Party,
whereas the parties to the right wanted to eliminate this form of tax on
higher earnings.
A new four-party coalition government took oﬃce after the election in
autumn 1991, and around the start of the new year the government formed
a Working Group with a mandate to reform the old age pension system.
The minister heading the reform committee, and the minister responsible
for the reform, was Bo Ko ¨nberg, who represented the liberal party. All
seven parties in Parliament at that time were given a place in the Working
Group, and, together with a handful of experts, they began their work in
1992. Anna Hedborg, who had represented the Social Democratic Party
in the Working Group, became the new Minister for Social Insurance with
the next change in government in 1996, ensuring the continuation of the
reform process.
From the outset, there was political agreement on the principles to be
followed: There should be a mandatory system providing coverage for all
persons residing and working in Sweden. There should also be an adequate
safety net, similar in coverage to that already in existence. Finally, the
system should be designed to secure intergenerational trust, with general
agreement that this could be achieved only by a ﬁnancially stable system.
Generally speaking, the proposals emerging from the public debate and
submitted by the various interest organizations and government agencies
favored a reform approaching or adopting lifetime accounts. This idea was
not new in the Swedish pension literature. In fact, the backbone of the
ﬁrst proposal made by the Pension Commission of the 1950s was a system
with lifetime accounts.16 The public discussion that emerged between 1990
and 1992 focused on the issues of PAYGO versus advance funding (and
individual choice), and, generally, on private versus public management of
funds and accounts.
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The starting position of the political parties was more or less the same
as in the 1950s. The Conservative and Liberal Parties favored lifetime ac-
counts and a stronger element of privately managed ﬁnancial accounts.
The Center (previously Farmers) Party and Christian Democratic Party
favored a large increase in the ﬂat rate at the bottom, with private insur-
ance on top (i.e., the original Beveridge model). These were the four parties
that formed a government coalition in the autumn of 1991.
The Social Democratic Party, now in opposition, favored a PAYGO
plan, but reconstructed to create more ﬁnancial stability. This could be
interpreted as moving more in the direction of lifetime accounts and main-
taining a public fund as a demographic reserve. Nevertheless, the greatest
opposition to reform also came from the rank and ﬁle of the Social Demo-
cratic Party: Many still wondered why they could not keep the old system
that had served older workers so well. On the other hand, the blue-collar
union, LO—a staunch supporter of the Social Democratic Party—was
among the earlier supporters of the reform because they could see that
lifetime accounts generally favored their members, and that more ﬁnancial
stability was needed to guarantee future beneﬁts.
The framework for the reform to come was presented for public scrutiny
in the autumn of 1992 (En Promoria 1992), with the vision presented being
shared by the ﬁve political parties just discussed (two others will be dis-
cussed later in the paper). This proposal was based on a system with life-
time accounts, with a certain portion going to individual ﬁnancial ac-
counts. The systems would otherwise be similar in that the annuity would
be based on lifetime account values at retirement, life expectancy, and a
real rate of return on accounts. There would be a guarantee and credits
in conjunction with childbearing, military service, and pursuit of higher
education, and payments made into the system for insured periods of sick-
ness, unemployment, and disability. Already suggested at this point was
that the overall contribution rate would be 18.5 percent, about what old
age pensions cost at the time. The political parties followed up this pub-
lished proposal with information and discussion materials distributed
throughout the country.17 Many important details of the reform remained
to be worked out and there still appeared to be room to maneuver for all
interest groups.
By the autumn of 1992 the Swedish economy had almost hit rock bot-
tom. Sweden was forced to let its currency depreciate and ﬂoat. Unem-
ployment had risen to a record postwar high, and once again the govern-
ment found itself undertaking massive debt ﬁnancing of welfare-state
transfers to hold up current consumption. With the fall of the Krona and
the generally precarious economic situation, and with seemingly no end in
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sight, the government established an Economic Commission, to be led by
economics professor Assar Lindbeck. The commission was charged with
examining the state of the economy from a structural perspective, and to
make proposals for change. The Lindbeck Commission, as it came to be
called, presented its report in early 1993. The commission proposed a long
list of structural changes for the pension system, in line with the general
framework for the reform proposed by the Pension Commission.18
This was the setting as the reform legislation was being ironed out in
1993. The Working Group on Pensions presented its proposal to the Par-
liament in the spring of 1994 (Working Group on Pensions 1994). The
reform had the support of the four parties in government and the Social
Democratic Party. These ﬁve parties represented more than 80 percent of
the voters and included the two largest parties in Swedish politics. Two
of these together, the conservative Moderata samlingsparti and the Social
Democratic Party, held approximately 60 percent of the seats in Parlia-
ment.
In sum, at the outset powerful groups in Swedish society were promoting
just about every conceivable scenario for change; reﬂecting back on the
discussion and positions taken in 1991, perhaps the common denominator
was lifetime accounts. Given this point of departure, it was possible to
discuss both nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial accounts; exactly how to enter life
expectancy into the PAYGO system; how to index in order to maintain
ﬁnancial stability; and ﬁnally, given that part of the system would be based
on ﬁnancial accounts, what form this system should take in practice. Di-
rectives were created for a new working group, composed mainly of per-
sons with experience in ﬁnance and insurance together with some of the
experts from the main working group, to work on this problem.
The main political lesson of Swedish reform is that without ownership
of the reform across party lines, it would not have been possible to do
more than simply tinker with the old system—and even this would have
been diﬃcult, as was witnessed by the futile attempt in the 1980s. The
consensus arose out of the shared view of the old system’s problems and a
sense of a mission to implement a structurally sound reform that would
provide suﬃcient mandatory beneﬁts, without impeding the performance
of the economy.
6.5 Financial Aﬀordability: The Record up to the Reform and the Future
6.5.1 Events Preceding the Reform
In 1976, Sweden’s “golden period” of postwar growth had just come to
an end, although politicians at the time did not know this. The general
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just experienced two decades of 3–4 percent real growth in the economy,
many believed this would be the path of the future. In 1976, the full-beneﬁt
age in the public old age pension system was decreased from sixty-seven
to sixty-ﬁve. In addition, all the major collective labor agreements were
eventually formulated to make sixty-ﬁve an obligatory pension age. This
seemed to be an order of things that was suitable to both employers and
collective labor. In eﬀect, to remain in the labor force after age sixty-ﬁve,
a worker had to become self-employed and contract out his or her services.
At the time, collective labor pushed the idea that a retirement beneﬁt at
age sixty-ﬁve was an integrated part of the overall employment agreement.
These labor-management agreements remained in place, and in spite of
the new reform, which is designed to enable individuals to work past the
age of sixty-ﬁve. Both employers and unions are reluctant to change. There
was a political consensus that this reluctance to change centrally negoti-
ated labor-management agreements would result in new legislation, estab-
lishing the right of individuals to keep their employment to the age of
sixty-seven. This came in 2001.
Behind this emerging shift in how the political system views “the” retire-
ment age is the trend in improved health and increased life expectancy,
and the question of who should pay the cost of increased life expectancy
for pensioners. Should it be future workers, as in the typical DB frame-
work, or workers before they retire—by working longer—which the DC
system encourages.
The major driving force behind the political consensus to remove im-
pediments to remaining active for older workers has been the increase in
life expectancy. On top of this, concern developed in the 1990s about the
trend in employment of persons older than ﬁfty-ﬁve. Let us examine brieﬂy
the history, in this respect, of the four decades since the ATP reform in
1960. The labor force increased by more than 50 percent, from about 2.7
million workers in 1960 to about 4.1–4.3 million in 1980, a level at which
it has remained since then. The increase was mainly a result of the full-
ﬂedged entrance of women into the workforce, with participation rates for
women born after 1945 equaling those of men. In addition, younger per-
sons now spend more time getting an education, and thus delay their en-
trance into the labor force.
The increase in the labor force has been somewhat mitigated by an in-
crease in disability claims, which doubled from about 150,000 to 300,000
between 1960 and 1980. In the 1990s the number of disability recipients
appears to have leveled out at around 420,000 persons, or about 9 percent
of the (potential) workforce. The ATP reform improved earnings replace-
ment for disability, and disability take-up increased as beneﬁts improved
and as criteria were applied more liberally. Since 1960, individuals have
also been able to claim an actuarially reduced beneﬁt from the old age
system from age sixty, and about 4 percent do so. In the 1990s, 22–25
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percent of persons age sixty to sixty-four had a full disability beneﬁt,19
which means that about 25–30 percent of persons aged sixty to sixty-four
have either a disability or an old age beneﬁt from the public system.
Gendel (1998) has recently compared the median age of exit from the
labor market with a social security beneﬁt in four countries, including Swe-
den. For Sweden, this age declined from 65.9 for men and 65.0 for women
in 1965–70 (before the decrease in the pension age from sixty-seven to
sixty-ﬁve), to 62.3 for men and 62.4 for women in 1990–95. Gendel shows
that American and Japanese women exited at about the same time as
Swedish women in the early 1990s, but that Japanese men waited more
than two years longer than Swedish men to claim a beneﬁt.
The age at which people leave the labor force is lower than the age at
which they claim an old age beneﬁt from the public system. In Sweden,
this age is inﬂuenced by the possibility for some workers to retire early
with an occupational beneﬁt and for other older workers to obtain sever-
ance pay from their employers. Presently, we have no good data to study
these phenomena, especially that of severance with pay, because this re-
muneration is lumped together with earnings in the nation’s income sta-
tistics.
What we can do is study employment among a cross-section of people
i nas p e c i ﬁ ca g eg r o u pa td i ﬀerent points of time. Using this method (see
Palmer 1999b; Wadensjo ¨ and Sjo ¨gren 2000), and examining employment
of persons aged ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-four, we ﬁnd that in the mid-1990s men
on average worked 6.5 out of a possible 10.0 years, implying an average
exit at age 61.5. The picture was better as recently as 1990 for men, who
worked an additional year, that is, about 7.5 of a possible 10.0 years be-
tween ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-four. Unemployment among older men was
around 2–3 percent until 1993, then increased to more than 10 percent in
1997, after which it began to decline.
Using the same approach, women worked on average a little more than
four of ten possible years, for an average of four years of work out of ten
possible and an implicit exit age of ﬁfty-nine. By 1998, with an improving
labor market, women were working about one year longer: ﬁve years with
an implicit exit at sixty (Wadensjo ¨ and Sjo ¨gren 2000). In addition, since
1994, about 10 percent of women over age sixty have been unemployed.
In an international comparison Sweden nevertheless does well in em-
ploying older workers. Within the OECD, only Iceland, Switzerland, Ja-
pan, and Norway employ a greater percentage of persons over ﬁfty-ﬁve
years of age (Wadensjo ¨ and Sjo ¨gren 2000). One of the reasons for Swedish
success in keeping older workers employed may be that even the old sys-
tem was designed with the goal of keeping employable persons in the labor
196 Edward Palmerforce up to age sixty-ﬁve. Palme and Svensson (1999) explain why, and as
it turns out, the “tax” pressure to leave the labor force is lower in Sweden
than in many other OECD countries (Gruber and Wise 1999).
In a DB system of the type Sweden had prior to the reform, the beneﬁt
formula did not reﬂect increasing life expectancy. In the 1950s, when the
ATP reform was being considered, a man who was sixty-ﬁve years old then
was expected to live about fourteen years past age sixty-ﬁve. For a woman
who was sixty-ﬁve at that time, life expectancy was around ﬁfteen years.
In the year 2000, a man who was sixty-ﬁve was expected to live 17.9 years,
and a woman, 21.3 (see table 6.3).
Life expectancy from age sixty-ﬁve increased by four years for men and
six years for women between 1960 and 2000: on average, more than one
year for every ten years. In the light of this, the oﬃcial forecast (from 1998)
is very cautious. Life expectancy is expected to continue to increase, but
the rate of increase is assumed to be much slower in the forecasts. With
the life expectancy increase in table 6.3, a DB pension for a new entrant
(born in 1975) into the workforce will cost, in 2040, 11 percent more for a
male and 7.5 percent more for a female than for a person retiring in the
year 2000 at the same age. What would happen if life expectancy were to
increase instead at the same rate as during the past forty years? The same
DB pension would cost 22 percent more for a person becoming a pen-
sioner in the year 2040 (person born 1975) compared with a person born
in 1935 and retiring in the year 2000.
In sum, the record in the four decades following the 1960 ATP reform
includes a decrease in the age at which Swedes claim a public pension and
a strong increase in the life expectancy of pensioners. In principle, the
reform has addressed this issue straight-on by strengthening the link be-
tween additional work and pension size, by rewarding older workers for
foregoing early retirement, and by making the annuity a direct function of
life expectancy. In practice, the ﬁnal link in the reform is to create legisla-
tion for the right of workers to remain employed until the age of sixty-
seven.
6.5.2 Who Should Pay the Bill for Increasing Life Expectancy?
The conﬂict of interests among politicians, employers, and unions has
its origin in the paradigm shift in thinking about the rights and obligations
Table 6.3 Life Expectancy from Age Sixty-Five
1960 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
Men 13.9 17.9 18.7 19.3 19.7 19.9
Women 15.4 21.3 21.9 22.4 22.7 22.9
Source: Statistics Sweden.
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and the remaining nonrandom risk can be distributed as it becomes known. In the new
Swedish system, the cost of any remaining change in life expectancy after retirement will be
shared between workers and pensioners, to the extent that ﬁnancial stability requires this.
See the discussion below on indexation.
21. Diamond (1997) and others have argued that advance-funded schemes with privately
managed individual accounts have an advantage compared with PAYGO systems in that they
minimize political risk. The NDC formulation, with correct indexation for ﬁnancial stability
and with annuities based on life expectancy, can be claimed to remove much of the political
risk inherent in typical PAYGO schemes.
of workers and pensioners in collective PAYGO pension schemes. The old
view, as it is revealed in the design of most PAYGO schemes in practice,
is that the risk of pensioners increasing longevity should fall on current
workers. This view is anchored in the principle that it is not right to change
the main source of income (i.e., pensions) for persons (pensioners) who
cannot react to this by adapting their own labor supply. With this view
there is no choice other than to charge current workers with the bill for
increasing life expectancy, given the rules created by preceding generations
as well as—at worst—the work and retirement decisions of the persons
who were following those oftentimes too-generous rules.
The new paradigm, embodied in the NDC reform adopted in Sweden,
is based on the insurance principle. The rules of the game are still set in
advance, but the principle maintained is that the fairest system is one in
which most—if not all—of the risk of increasing longevity is shifted to
individuals while working and away from future workers or the pensioners
themselves when they are retired.20 In this way, expectations of future lon-
gevity become one of the determinants of our private decisions about work
and leisure, and about consumption and saving, before we retire com-
pletely.
The Swedish reform uses the NDC PAYGO model to implement full
decision ﬂexibility for older workers and makes it easy to exit gradually
from the work force. Because the system is actuarially fair and beneﬁts
have, in principle, the same form of indexation before and after retirement,
the increment to lifetime resources that arises is derived from working
longer and paying more contributions.
In the old system, under which future workers were assumed to pay the
bill for increasing life expectancy, an implicit transfer was built into the
system. In the end, however, future workers would always have the alterna-
tive to vote for forms of indexation or changes in tax schedules that shift
resources back to themselves. The NDC PAYGO system as it has been
formulated in Sweden substantially reduces this transfer, and the associ-
ated future political risk.21 With increasing life expectancy, and all other
things equal, an individual will have to work longer in order to maintain
a given level of lifetime consumption. The alternative is to choose less
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should be set up with a contract under which future workers subsidize
early exit from the labor force for current workers. In insurance terms, the
legitimate reason to shift the cost of early exit to others in the insurance
collective is reduced working capacity owing to poor health or functional
handicap.
What individuals clearly lose in the new Swedish system is a “subsidy”
to retire early in a world with improving health and increasing life expec-
tancy. In this new paradigm for social security, the individual chooses be-
tween work and leisure after reaching the minimum retirement age, with
two new advantages: First, work or leisure can be combined with partial
beneﬁts (claimed at diﬀerent times) from one or both of the two public
systems. Second, covered work always yields contributions that produce
higher beneﬁts; that is, the system is fair. Because future workers bear the
cost of the subsidy in the old system it is in the interests of organized labor
to create a neutral system in this sense.
In a free market setting without protective employment legislation or
strong union interests promoting the right of older workers to keep their
jobs, individuals and employers freely negotiate individual contracts. In
countries having strong employment legislation to protect individual
rights, but also collective agreements beyond those needed to restrict
rights for reasons of functional capacity with regard to certain work tasks,
an additional step may have to be taken. The remaining question is
whether the employment legislation should establish the right of older
workers to remain until a certain age. In Sweden, politicians say yes, and
this age has been set at sixty-seven. In practice, at least in the near future,
most Swedes will probably prefer to exit earlier anyway; but as time goes
on and as health continues to improve and life expectancy to increase, this
will provide the opportunity for more people to choose to work longer.
6.5.3 The Swedish Reform and Aﬀordability
Trends in the numbers of pensioners and contributors, along with the
construction of the beneﬁt formula, determine pension costs and the share
of wages workers must pay to maintain the PAYGO system commitments.
The contribution rate that must be paid to maintain a DB PAYGO system
is simply the ratio of beneﬁt payments to the covered wage bill. Breaking
down beneﬁt payments into the product of the average beneﬁt (b) times
the number of beneﬁciaries (P) and the wage bill into the average wage (w)
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ample, with two workers per pensioner, (P/N  0.5), and with a policy
goal to maintain a contribution rate of 18.5 percent, the ratio of an average
beneﬁt to an average wage will be 0.37. With three workers per pensioner
(P/N  0.33), the average PAYGO beneﬁt can be about 56 percent of an
average wage. The diﬀerence between three and two workers per pensioner
means a lot, then, and this simple example illustrates that a country has a
lot to gain by keeping people in the work force.
Table 6.4 shows how the dependency ratio has developed in Sweden
since the ATP reform in 1960. The ratio of both old age and disability
pensioners to contributors was 33 percent in 1960 and about 50 percent at
the time of the reform. In other words, there were three workers per bene-
ﬁciary in 1960 but only two by the mid-1990s. In terms of the simple equa-
tion above, a pretax old age beneﬁt amounting to 65 percent of an average
contributor’s wage required a contribution rate of a little more than 18
percent in 1960 and almost 25 percent in 1997. With the 1997 dependency
ratio, the contribution rate required to maintain, for both old age and dis-
ability, an average beneﬁt level of 65 percent of a contributor’s average
wage would be 31 percent.
When the reform was being discussed in the early 1990s, the oﬃcial
demographic forecast indicated Sweden would have about 2 million per-
sons over the age of sixty-ﬁve in 2025, an increase of about 25 percent
since the turn of the century. The number of contributors will be about the
same, however. In fact, the number of pensioners would be larger because
there are also persons living abroad who have worked in Sweden and have
earned the right to some portion of an earnings-related beneﬁt. If we con-
tinue with the above example, it would require a contribution rate in the
old age system of 31 percent to maintain an average beneﬁt amounting to
65 percent of an average wage, and of 37 percent for old age and disabil-
ity together.
The old Swedish system was not as expensive as this exercise might
suggest, however; beneﬁts did not keep up with real wage growth because
Table 6.4 Dependency Rate (pensioners [P] as a percentage of contributors [N ])
1960 1970 1980 1990 1997
Old age beneﬁts 754 969 1,382 1,554 1,592
Disability beneﬁts 145 212 303 361 417
Contributors 2,692 3,422 4,126 4,387 4,160
Dependency  old age beneﬁts/
contributors 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.38
Dependency  (old age beneﬁts 
disability beneﬁts)/contributors 0.33 0.35 0.41 0.44 0.48
Source: Swedish National Social Insurance Board.
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(1994). The result depends on what one assumes about the future development of the distri-
bution of earnings. The distribution used in these calculations reﬂects that of the ﬁrst half
of the 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s, renewed growth was unevenly distributed in
favor of high-income earners. This distribution would have led to a higher percentage of
earnings above the ceiling.
they were indexed with prices, not wages. The result is similar to multi-
plying the equation above with a reduction factor based on expected real
growth and the survival rates for beneﬁciaries.
6.5.4 Projected Financial Costs
Finally, what happens to costs with and without the reform? To compare
the new system with the old, the funded second pillar of the mandatory
public system can be treated as an NDC component by setting the rate of
return equal to the rate assumed for the NDC system. This has been done
in table 6.5, in which the contribution rate upon which capital is accredited
to accounts is 18.5 percent.
The ceiling has been indexed with real growth in the old-system scenar-
ios to make them comparable. With real growth and a ﬁxed ceiling, in-
creasingly more wage earners would have larger and larger proportions of
their earnings above the ceiling. Because of this, in the very long run the
system would evolve into a ﬂat-rate system with the same beneﬁt for all.
In the 2 percent growth alternative, this process would have reduced costs
by about 5–10 percent in 2025 compared to the scenario with an indexed
ceiling, and by 15–20 percent by 2050.22 Of course, one of the alternatives
to the reform had been to let this process simply continue, pushing future
commitments increasingly into the occupational schemes, which before the
reform were DB schemes. In terms of ﬁnancial consequences for the public
sector, the major problem with this strategy was that it worked much too
Table 6.5 Contribution Rate Needed for Balance without a Fund
2000 2020 2040 2060
Old system
1% growth 16 24.1 28.7 29.8
2% growth 16 20.6 22.5 22.9
New system
Per capita wage indexation
1% growth 16 19.5 19.9 20.0
2% growth 16 18.8 19.4 19.6
New system
Wage sum wage indexation
1% growth 16 19.5 19.3 19.1
2% growth 16 18.9 18.8 18.8
Notes: Ratio of pension expenditures to the contribution base.
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much too expensive by 2020–30.
Oneoftheproblemswiththeoldsystemwasthatthedevelopmentofben-
eﬁts poorly reﬂected the ability of the system to bear costs. In any given
twenty-year period the cost of beneﬁts were largely determined by past
events. The ability to pay was a function instead of the growth of the con-
tribution base. The system was designed for 3 percent growth, worked
adequately with 2 percent growth, but became very expensive with 1 per-
cent growth or less. This is illustrated in table 6. 5. Without reform, and
with yearly per capita wage growth of 1 percent, pension costs would have
increased by about 50 percent, from over 18 percent to over 26 percent by
2020. In the new system, the guarantee costs about 2 percent in the ﬁrst
decade, but since it is price indexed, its cost declines slowly with time.
For a long time, pension costs will continue to reﬂect old-system com-
mitments. Beginning in 2003, when persons born in 1938 turn sixty-ﬁve,
the new system will begin to go into eﬀect in the sense that the ﬁrst cohort
will receive beneﬁts based partially on the new rules. It will take until
2019 for all newly granted beneﬁts to be calculated entirely with the NDC
formula. The reform also strikes a deal with persons born before 1938,
who are almost all retired by the year 2000. The deal is that even their
beneﬁts will be indexed with the same index used to adjust NDC annuities
when they diverge from actual real growth of 1.6 percent. Thus, from the
beginning of 2002, if growth falls below 1.6 percent the beneﬁts of existing
pensioners are reduced by the diﬀerence between actual growth and 1.6
percent. It is this process that—together with the gradual introduction of
the NDC beneﬁt—holds down costs in 2000–20. With 1.0 percent wage
growth, costs are reduced to a contribution rate of 19.5 percent, instead
of 24.1 percent without the reform. This was also part of the Swedish
pension discussion in the early 1990s, when the National Social Insurance
Board ﬁrst proposed this mechanism.
The other side of the deal is that pensioners’ beneﬁts are increased by
the diﬀerence between actual growth and 1.6 percent when wage growth
is higher. This still costs less than the downside scenario with 1.0 percent
growth, expressed in terms of the contribution rate needed to support ben-
eﬁt payments. This gives pensioners partial wage indexation, but the con-
tribution base increases more quickly with the full rate of growth of aver-
age wages.
By 2040 almost all pensioners will have NDC beneﬁts. The new system
never fully reaches its equilibrium of 18.5 percent, because the calculations
include the cost of the guarantee. Table 6.5 shows the diﬀerence between
per capita wage indexation of NDC beneﬁts and wage-sum indexation.
There is a diﬀerence because the labor force is slowly declining in this
demographic scenario: for any given rate of per capita wage growth, the
contribution base will grow at a slower rate, and wage-sum indexation
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holds costs in line with the equilibrium rate of 18.5 percent. In the Swedish
reform the balance index will perform this function.
Part of the remaining gap between actual costs and 18.5 percent has to
do with the way life expectancy is entered into the NDC formula in prac-
tice in the Swedish reform. Life expectancy is calculated in terms of an
average of the four last known years prior to a beneﬁt claim. A strict actu-
arial procedure would be based on a projection, and with increasing life
expectancy there would be less to mop up.23
Swedish Parliament decided to use per capita wage indexation and to
calculate life expectancy as it is entered into the calculation of the annuity
using ex post data. On the other hand, the NDC system begins with a
large fund, and yields on this will be used to help ﬁnance beneﬁts. (In fact,
a larger portion will be invested in equities in the future.) In order to rem-
edy the threat to ﬁnancial equilibrium, a balance index has been created,
based on the ratio of the actual pension debt to the theoretical debt using
wage-sum indexation. When this index falls below unity, beneﬁts are in-
dexed downward, with the same eﬀect as that of wage-sum indexation (see
Settergren 2001).
In sum, the reform has also introduced an indexation mechanism for
the transition period that will keep the system in ﬁnancial balance. In the
long run, the system moves toward ﬁnancial equilibrium. There will always
be imperfections in the actual engineering of systems until we have the
facts in hand, because (for example) of the uncertainty about life expec-
tancy and perhaps for other reasons that also have to do with how life
expectancy enters the annuity. For this reason, some of the risk of increas-
ing life expectancy may still have to be shifted to pensioners to achieve
balance, but this eﬀect will be very small if it occurs at all.
6.6 Conclusions
The ﬁrst conclusion from Swedish pension reform is that political inter-
ests representing a broad spectrum of interests can be brought together in
consensus. Second, although there are usually options at each point along
the road in engineering reform, the framework of the reform consisted of
principles for which there was broad agreement. This is what held the
reform eﬀort together. Third, the reform that developed appears to have
central elements that should keep it resilient in the future. The most impor-
tant of these are the transition to lifetime accounts (notional and ﬁnancial)
and the use of life expectancy throughout in the mandatory public system,
with the resultant shift in the ﬁnancial cost of aging to workers while they
are working. Financial stability has been achieved even in the near fu-
ture—the next twenty years—with the introduction of wage indexation
Swedish Pension Reform: Its Past and Its Future 203with a norm of 1.6 percent rather than zero. This means that, even with
poor economic growth, the system will make it through the transition into
the new NDC and advance-funded systems, and thereafter should remain
ﬁnancially stable.
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Comments Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ
Edward Palmer has written an insightful account of the very important
and interesting notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) redesign of the Swed-
ish pension system. According to Palmer, the Swedish reform will keep the
current 18.5 percent Swedish payroll tax rate used to ﬁnance the pension
system from rising by roughly one third; that is, if future economic growth
is modest. With more rapid economic growth, the reform will have a
smaller impact in mitigating future payroll tax hikes. However, in that case,
the requisite tax hike is itself rather modest.
In addition to limiting future payroll tax increases, Palmer praises the
Swedish reform for improving beneﬁt-tax linkage, eliminating capricious
redistribution, providing an automatic ﬁnancial stabilizer to deal with lon-
gevity increases, and introducing a small funded component to the state’s
compulsory pension system.
Although I agree with much of Palmer’s assessment and believe he and
his Swedish colleagues deserve a great deal of credit for steering the coun-
try away from what might, and I stress might, have been a calamitous pol-
icy path, my job is to play devil’s advocate—and the devil here has much
to say.
The ﬁrst and most important concern is that the reform made a pay-as-
you-go (PAYGO) ﬁnanced state pension scheme a permanent component
of Swedish ﬁscal policy when it could otherwise have been phased out
through time. Under the old system, beneﬁts were paid up to a time-
invariant ceiling. Thus, had no reform occurred, the system would have
naturally disappeared as an ever larger share of workers found their bene-
ﬁts were capped by this ceiling. The notional account reform, in linking
state pension beneﬁts to accumulated past contributions, has eﬀectively
indexed the pension system to the size of the economy, making it impos-
sible for Sweden ever to outgrow this ﬁscal albatross.
Now Palmer believes that outgrowing the old system would have been
impossible because Swedish governments would have responded, over
time, to the natural shrinking of the pension system by periodically raising
the beneﬁt ceiling. This belief carries over to Palmer’s analysis of the gains
from reform. For example, in his table 6.5 comparison of payroll tax rates
under the new and old pension systems, Palmer assumes that absent the
reform, growth of the ceiling would have equaled growth in real wages.
Although Palmer may be right, at least historically, the ceiling was never
raised. Table 6.5 would beneﬁt from showing how much the payroll tax
would have declined had pension reform never occurred and the ceiling
never been raised. This addition to the table would likely show that the
206 Edward Palmerreform may have signiﬁcantly raised long-run payroll tax rates and squan-
dered a golden opportunity for getting out from under a PAYGO system
once and for all.
A second concern involves transparency and beneﬁt-tax linkage. The
new system says that a thirty-year-old worker will receive marginal beneﬁts
in old age in exchange for his or her marginal contributions at age thirty.
The precise amount of these future beneﬁts, however, is highly uncertain
because it depends on the following three factors: (1) economy-wide real
wage growth, because contributions accumulate each year based on an-
nual per capita real wage growth; (2) longevity improvements, because
annual beneﬁts are actuarially determined; and (3) a hard-to-understand
“balance index adjustment” that adjusts beneﬁts to maintain a certain size
pension reserve fund.
These three factors leave workers with a claim to future pension beneﬁts
that is highly uncertain and very hard to comprehend. Contrast this way
of establishing an NDC with the detailed NDC proposal I formulated with
Michael Boskin and John Shoven in 1980 (Boskin, Kotlikoﬀ, and Shoven
1988; hereafter BKS). The BKS plan, which we presented to the 1983
Greenspan Commission on U.S. Social Security reform, determined for
the worker each year the marginal beneﬁt he or she would receive in retire-
ment for that year’s contribution. The BKS scheme uses actuarial formulas
to connect future retirement, survivor, and disability beneﬁts to current
contributions. The plan also speciﬁed the use of the very latest survival
probabilities in calculating the amount of additional future pension bene-
ﬁts to be “purchased” each year in exchange for that year’s contributions.
The single discount rate used each year to discount all future amounts in
these actuarial calculations is, in the BKS plan, chosen to produce present
value ﬁnancial balance in the overall pension system. Speciﬁcally, a lower
rate of return is used in the actuarial formulas if the present value of sys-
tem-wide future beneﬁts, discounted at the then-prevailing term structure
of market-determined government bonds rates, exceeds (1) the present
value of system-wide future contributions, where these contributions are
also discounted using the latest term structure of rates of return on govern-
ment bonds, plus (2) the system’s current reserves.
In choosing each year’s NDC discount rate to keep the system in pres-
ent-value balance, and in using the latest survival probabilities in the cal-
culation, the BKS NDC plan, like the Swedish plan, makes automatic
adjustments for longevity changes and long-term ﬁnancial imbalances.
However, it does so in a way that does not make a worker’s annual future
beneﬁts highly uncertain right up to the moment he or she retires. Rather
than foisting so much risk on new retirees, the BKS plan spreads that
risk across all current workers. In so doing, it appears to provide better
intergenerational risk sharing than does the Swedish plan.
A third concern one can raise with the Swedish reform involves the 2.5
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in the marketplace, ostensibly to help ensure that they do not end up with
lower living standards in old age. Thus a social goal underlies this policy.
Yet in permitting workers to (1) choose whatever portfolios of assets they
like, (2) try to beat the market, (3) try to time the market, and (4) pay
whatever loads, fees, and commissions investment companies can induce
them to absorb, the Swedish government has, in eﬀect, forced workers
to play the lottery collectively with 2.5 percent of their lifetime incomes.
Contrast this with the proposal Jeﬀ Sachs and I put forward for a funded
pillar in which all workers’ contributions are invested in a single, market-
weight, global index of stocks and bonds. By requiring that workers invest
in the same fully diversiﬁed portfolio, the Kotlikoﬀ-Sachs (1998; hereafter
KS) plan ensures that all workers receive the same rate of return. In addi-
tion, competition to sell this single portfolio would drive fees and commis-
sions down to very low levels.
The presumed response to the KS plan is that workers have diﬀerent
tolerances for risk and should, therefore, be permitted to invest in light of
their own risk preferences. The counterargument has three elements. First,
a social plan to guarantee old age income support should not promote
old age income disparities among otherwise identically situated workers.
Second, diﬀerences in risk preferences do not necessarily imply that work-
ers should hold diﬀerent portfolios of risky assets. Indeed, this is the key
point of the capital asset pricing model and other models of portfolio allo-
cation. Third, many households choose what appear to be patently inap-
propriate investments, either far too conservative (e.g., investing all assets
in certiﬁcates of deposit) or far too risky (e.g., investing all assets in a
single stock). If governments feel they need to force their constituents to
save, they must believe that many of them lack the capacity to formulate
and carry out appropriate saving plans. Why, then, should such govern-
ments presume these same constituents will be able to formulate and un-
dertake appropriate portfolio choices? David Blake’s paper (chapter 10
in this volume) provides ample evidence of the problems incurred when
inexperienced investors are set upon by experienced money managers.
My ﬁnal concern with the Swedish reform and Edward Palmer’s defense
of it is that the ﬁnancial viability of that program must be considered in
light of the ﬁnancial viability of the entire Swedish ﬁscal enterprise. A
recent generational accounting study of Sweden’s long-term ﬁnances sug-
gests that Sweden, like most other developed countries, faces signiﬁcant
ﬁscal stresses with the impending retirement of the baby boom generation
(Raﬀelhu ¨schen and Kotlikoﬀ 1999). In light of the substantial imbalance
in Swedish generational policy, one must ask whether future Swedes can
really aﬀord to pay close to 20 percent of their lifetime incomes to the
pension system when their taxes for so many other programs are already
high and likely to rise dramatically. Stated diﬀerently, although the Swed-
208 Edward Palmerish reform appears to have greatly reduced the long-term ﬁscal problems
facing that nation, it is unclear whether it went far enough in that di-
rection.
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Discussion Summary
In his reply to the discussant, Edward Palmer explained that in Sweden
people receive an account statement every year. This account statement
shows the value of the individual account converted into an increment to
the beneﬁts—given today’s projection of life expectancy. Palmer said that
he does not see a substantial diﬀerence between the beneﬁts calculated in
the Swedish notional deﬁned contribution system and an annuity com-
puted by a private insurance company. The only diﬀerence is the existence
of funds in the one system but not in the other. Palmer emphasized that
necessary adjustments are automatic and as explicit as possible in the
Swedish system. According to Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ, there is a diﬀerence
between the Swedish notional deﬁned contribution (NDC) system and his
own proposal. In the NDC system, the beneﬁts in the annual account
statement change from year to year with changes in the underlying param-
eters. In Kotlikoﬀ’s proposal, the beneﬁts in the account statement do not
change through time. Edward Palmer disagreed and said that he does not
s e ead i ﬀerence between the two proposals.
Palmer reported that during the debate about pension reform there were
some proposals to let the old system die by having the “ceiling take its
toll,” as the discussant suggested. However, these proposals were not put
on the table by the major political parties. Palmer said that the problem
would be that the ceiling would take its toll on diﬀerent groups in diﬀerent
ways and at diﬀerent times. Concerning the survivor beneﬁts, he noted
that the goal in the 1989 part of the reform process was to eliminate the
survivor beneﬁts. The excuse for that was that the safety net was adequate
Swedish Pension Reform: Its Past and Its Future 209without them. He raised doubts about this assessment. He also reported
that there was a discussion about keeping overall balance in the whole
public sector. He expressed his skepticism about the success of these plans.
Referring to the discussant’s proposal of introducing an index fund instead
of the large number of funds, Palmer said that he expects that many index
funds are going to be oﬀered and that people can choose such a fund if
they want to.
Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan raised three questions about the notional accounts.
First, he asked whether intertemporal or interpersonal transfers are pos-
sible in the notional accounts system. Second, he noted that notional ac-
counts may make pension reform harder in the future, because it will be
harder to adjust the system if it is in trouble. He asked whether this eﬀect
has been taken into consideration in the Swedish reforms. Third, he re-
ferred to some rumors concerning troubles in managing the notional ac-
counts. He wanted to know what these rumors are about. Edward Palmer
answered that transfers would be possible in principle, and in the begin-
ning of the reform process there were thoughts about introducing transfers
between spouses. However, it was then decided to let divorce law legisla-
tion take this into consideration. The management problems mentioned by
Bo ¨rsch-Supan had to do with delays in the introduction of the information
technology system for the second pillar. The system began in September
2000 instead of September 1999.
Assar Lindbeck called the Swedish pension reform progress, because the
system now includes automatic adjustment mechanisms that adjust the
system to increased longevity or changes in the tax base. Lindbeck called
it one of the greatest advantages of the Swedish system to increase the
freedom of choice and to return some responsibility to the individuals.
Jeﬀrey Liebman referred to concerns that the introduction of notional
accounts reduces the amount of redistribution in the social security sys-
tem. In his view, that does not have to be the case, because the govern-
ments can collect taxes proportional to earnings and contribute to the no-
tional accounts in a redistributive way. With respect to redistribution in
the Swedish system, he asked whether there is still a ﬂat beneﬁt in addition
to the means-tested anti-poverty program. Liebman also wanted to know
whether during the debate about setting up the new program there were
discussions of funding the notional accounts in progressive manners. Ed-
ward Palmer answered that there is no longer a ﬂat beneﬁt but instead a
guaranteed beneﬁt, which very much resembles the Finnish system. The
guaranteed beneﬁt, however, is not enough to live on, so that some people
need housing supplements or means-tested social assistance in addition to
the guaranteed beneﬁt.
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